Ignored voices: women and the media in Syria’s new era

On 8 December 2024, Syria entered a new political era, ending 54 years of Al-Assad family rule. The transition placed power in the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former Al-Qaeda-linked militant group. While the end of Al-Assad era sparked widespread optimism, early formal statements from the new rulers raised concerns, particularly regarding women’s roles.

In December 2024 and January 2025, two key statements shaped the evolving discourse. First, Obaida Arnaout, spokesperson for the Political Administration of the Military Operations Command Administration, stated that women’s “biological and psychological nature” made them incompatible with certain roles, such as positions within the Ministry of Defence. Subsequently, Aisha Al-Debs, Director of the Women’s Affairs Office, declared her intention to create a model for Syrian women based on Islamic Sharia, rejecting “imported” frameworks and external support deemed ideologically incompatible. She said: “(…) But I will not open the door to those who differ with me in thought. We suffered from ‘western and local western-supported’ organisations that had agendas harmful to our children and women, as they presented inappropriate programmes that resulted in disastrous results.”

She labelled past “western and western-supported” programmes as harmful, blaming them for rising divorce rates.

Al-Debs’ statements, particularly her emphasis on women’s primary role within the family and her rejection of external influence, triggered significant backlash on social media. Critics questioned her vision and her suitability for the position. In response, Al-Debs defended her approach, asserting that Syrian women would develop a unique model rooted in their “beliefs, civilization, history and diversity.”

Had media outlets actively engaged in this conversation, they could have initiated a crucial debate regarding the new rulers’ discourse on women’s participation in the transitional phase. However, media outlets remained largely silent.

In both cases, the new rulers’ lack of official communication fuelled a wave of ironic social media reactions. Telegram, Facebook and WhatsApp became the main channels for information, while local media remained silent, deepening public disapproval.

Women journalists and activists responded swiftly to Aisha al-Dibs’ remarks, using social media and media interviews to voice their diverse opinions. Critiques included questioning al-Dibs’ suitability for the role and arguing that her statements relegated women’s rights to a secondary concern in a “race of priority Olympics” during the transitional period. In my opinion, while online reactions acknowledged the inherent difficulty of any single statement representing the complexity of Syrian women’s perspectives, they also seemed to justify a failure to articulate a more inclusive vision.

The initial days of the transition, a few weeks before those statements, marked by the release of prisoners from former regime detention facilities, highlighted the media’s responsibility in navigating crucial transitional events. Video documentation of these releases revealed scenes of emotional reunions, contrasting with the unresolved agony of families searching for missing loved ones. The prison liberation process, in my opinion, appeared more like a theatrical display designed to serve as a distraction. Reports indicate that departing regime soldiers destroyed documents, and access to the prisons was largely uncontrolled, raising concerns that crucial evidence regarding the fate of the disappeared could be compromised.

Families of the missing and forcibly disappeared, mainly women activists, urgently demanded the preservation of prison records and facilities to ensure accountability and transitional justice. However, these calls were met with silence from both the new ruling authorities and local media. The public discourse remained fixated on portraying the prison openings as a symbolic victory for HTS. This represented another example where media outlets failed to critically engage with the new rulers’ actions or provide a platform for women activists to voice their concerns. Shortly after, attention shifted to the national conference and its preparations. The new rulers hastily convened a conference to declare the revolution’s victory and appointed Ahmad Al-Sharaa (formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) as president of the transitional phase. This conference was anticipated as a pivotal moment, the first opportunity for the new leadership to address the Syrian public. However, despite expectations, neither the conference nor Al-Sharaa’s speech, was broadcast on television channels or any media affiliated with the new rulers. Instead, the next day Al-Sharaa delivered a pre-recorded televised speech addressing the Syrian people after being appointed as Syria’s president for the “transitional period”, and a photograph of the attendees, circulated primarily on Telegram and other social media platforms.

The photograph conveyed a powerful message: the conference was attended by a select group of predominantly Sunni Arab, military and Islamist men who declared the “victory of the Syrian revolution” and announced a series of major political decisions. Notably, some of these decisions became more ambiguous after their announcement. The image of Ahmad Al-Sharaa, clad in military uniform, being installed as president of the transitional phase, reinforced the widespread sentiment: “Whoever liberates (the country) will rule.” Yet, the media failed to ask a single question about why women were left out of the victory celebration.

Debates over the new Syrian rulers’ stance on women’s rights have repeatedly surfaced on social media. This trend emerged following a December meeting between Ahmad Al-Sharaa and a delegation of Syrian American women. A single photograph, placing Al-Sharaa at the centre, ignited online debate. Social media users were divided, with some interpreting the photograph as a sign of openness to women’s participation, while others saw it as conflicting with Al-Sharaa’s ideology.

Following the meeting, discussions shifted away from substantive issues and instead focused on  Al-Sharaa’s marital status, his wife’s unpublicised meeting with the delegation, women’s clothes, head coverings and handshakes, particularly referencing interactions seen during the German Foreign Ministry meeting. This preoccupation with appearances eclipsed any meaningful discussion of the meetings’ agendas and outcomes.

From January 2025 onward, media coverage has largely concentrated on the National Conference preparatory committee. Notably, media outlets have echoed the new rulers’ emphasis on economic recovery, while neglecting any intersectional analysis. While some media outlets have offered limited critiques, the general trend indicates that the media has become entangled in the new rulers’ narrative, repeating their talking points and adopting their priorities. This pattern becomes particularly concerning given HTS’s history in Idlib province, northern Syria, where they have consistently oppressed freedom of expression.

The composition of the National Conference preparatory committee, featuring two women, Huda Atassi and Hind Qabwat, alongside five men, provided another test of the media’s performance during Syria’s transitional phase. Media discourse revealed significant shortcomings, marked by either weak coverage of the committee’s unbalanced gender representation or an excessive focus on the women’s religious identities, Huda as a Sunni Muslim and Hind as a Christian, suggesting their inclusion was merely a token gesture. The media largely framed their presence as an achievement, instead of questioning the committee’s overall imbalance.

As a woman journalist, I experienced firsthand the new rulers’ perspective on the role of media during this critical phase. Upon returning to Syria after 11 years, I faced restrictions in carrying out my media work. I was required to seek permission from the Ministry of Information, one of the first ministries to be seized and administered by the new rulers. Before receiving a mere three-day permit, I underwent an unofficial investigation. The fact that I am Alawite, the same minority as the former ruling family, and share the last name “Assad” with the dictator, despite having no relation to him, were deemed sufficient grounds for sectarian scrutiny and discrimination. While other journalists and influencers received two-week permits, my three-day limit was imposed due to my background and my intention to report from the coastal region, where the Alawite majority resides and has faced acts of revenge under-reported by the media.

To conclude, since 8 December 2024, the day the former regime fell, events in Syria have unfolded rapidly. The lack of communication from the new rulers has significantly impacted media coverage, with discourse on women’s rights clearly not being a priority. The new rulers’ reliance on social media over official media channels has led to a media coverage that often overlooks or misrepresents women’s roles and participation in the transitional phase. This pattern, combined with direct experiences of journalists facing restrictions, underscores a broader issue of limited press freedom and a disregard for diverse perspectives, particularly those of women.

Note: This article examines key events from 8 December 2024, to February 2025, highlighting media performance during that period. It follows on Rula Asad’s contributions to the No women, no peace: Media’s role in the Women, Peace and Security Agenda report, the research for which was completed prior to 8 December 2024.Read the report here.