Digital infrastructures in Afghanistan

This report documents how the development of internet and mobile access and connectivity in Afghanistan over the last 20 years has boosted access to information, but also left its citizens open to control and surveillance. A country’s digital infrastructure is like its road system, but for the internet. Digital infrastructure enables data to move between computers, phones and servers. If a government or company controls the roads, they can decide where people can go, how fast they can travel, or even shut down access entirely. Similarly, whoever controls digital infrastructure can limit or block internet access, monitor online activity, or prioritise certain services over others.

This report, published by Think Tank for Digital Infrastructure and IMS in December 2024, explores how access to the internet has developed in Afghanistan, and its future trajectory under the Taliban (De Facto Authorities, DFA). It examines the DFA’s  powers over citizens’ access to information and its abilities to track and surveil its people. The aim of the report is to help inform the strategies and considerations of international development agencies and NGOs seeking to support digital infrastructures through the case of Afghanistan.

Backed by foreign investments and international development aid, Afghanistan’s digital infrastructure has gone through massive change over three phases. Up until 2001, prior to the fall of the first Taliban regime, Internet access in the country was minimal, consisting of dial-up connections, satellite links by NGOs, and a general ban. After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and in the ensuing 20 years up until 2021, international funding facilitated rapid expansion of telecommunications, including NATO’s “Silk Highway” project and fiber-optic networks. Mobile communication also became widespread. When the current Taliban regime (DFA) took over in 2021, the DFA shifted from initially restricting access to actively promoting connectivity and encouraging foreign investment in it. Alongside this, however, digital censorship has intensified, with bans on platforms like TikTok. Although platforms  such as Facebook, YouTube, and WhatsApp remain widely used, the DFA regulates content, blocks websites, and controls the Afghan domain registry.

Afghanistan’s internet connects globally via neighbouring countries, with most traffic controlled by the Ministry of Communications and IT (MCIT). The country’s only Internet Exchange Point (IXP), NIXA in Kabul, is also state-controlled. This allows the government to implement targeted network shutdowns to suppress protests and media reporting. While local providers can block websites, the government can sever Afghanistan’s connection to the global internet through kill switches. As a result, digital expansion not only enhances connectivity but also strengthens state control, with the potential for severe restrictions on freedom of speech. Furthermore, the DFA’s abilities to potentially access personal data through Internet Service Providers, mobile applications, and digital surveillance tools poses risks to users as they can be tracked and their data harvested to form legal cases.

Development agencies must carefully balance connectivity support with safeguards against its misuse for repression. The report suggests that the international development community consider a number of factors when providing support to Afghanistan’s digital infrastructure, although the list is far from exhaustive:

-Help to provide access to encryption tools that enables a more secure digital identity for users.

-Focus on promoting independent information platforms resistant to censorship.

-Look to strengthen digital literacy initiatives to help Afghans navigate online risks.

-Ensure safeguards to prevent donor-funded infrastructure from strengthening digital authoritarianism.

For more information on the report, please contact Emilie Lehmann-Jacobsen, PhD, IMS Senior Adviser at ele@mediasupport.org.